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Abstract  
This report examines how suburban characteristics may have hampered grantees’ 
administration of the first round of Neighborhood Stabilization Program (NSP1) funding. The 
report focuses on NSP1’s “set-aside” requirement which was designed to preserve housing 
(either rental or owner) affordable to very-low income families. This report reviews available 
literature and uses interviews with HUD (who administered the program), nonprofit partners, 
and two Florida grantees to examine the effect of four community characteristics: goals that are 
contrary to the creation of affordable housing, limited capacity to administer NSP, a dearth of 
NSP-eligible multifamily properties, and limited capacity in the jurisdiction’s nonprofit 
community. This report finds that many grantees struggled with the fast pace of this crisis-
response program. However, this fast pace directed HUD’s attention to grantees that were 
chronic under-performers under other block grant programs such as CDBG, and may have 
improved grantee capacity as well as their relationship with HUD. 
 
      
i 
 
Biographical Sketch 
Nathaniel Decker is a second-year Masters of City and Regional Planning student at Cornell 
University. He graduated from Oberlin College with a BA in Biology and Environmental History. 
His research interests include affordable housing, fair housing, and neighborhood stabilization.      
ii 
 
Acknowledgments 
Thanks to my advisors, Mildred Warner and Rolf Pendall. Particular thanks go to David 
Noguera, who showed me around HUD and vastly improved my ability to understand NSP. 
Finally, thanks to Maya Brennan, who first suggested that NSP1’s set-aside might be fruitful 
topic.      
iii 
 
Table of Contents          
Chapter 1: Introduction                  1 
Chapter 2: Literature Review                8 
Chapter 3: Methodology                29 
Chapter 4: Analysis of Interviews              37 
Chapter 5: Conclusion                  57 
Appendix A: Schedule of Interviews             65 
Appendix B: Instrument for Grantee Interviews          66 
References                    68 
 
 
 
 
List of Figures 
Figure 1: Description of NSP 1, 2, & 3              3 
Figure 2: Conceptual Framework for Study             22 
Figure 3: Expected Findings for Interviews             24 
Figure 4: Revised Conceptual Framework              55 
      
iv 
 
List of Abbreviations 
AMI – Area Median Income 
CDBG – Community Development Block Grant 
DRGR – Disaster Recovery Grant Reporting (HUD’s grant monitoring system for NSP) 
HUD – The US Department of Housing and Urban Development 
HERA – The Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 
NCST – National Community Stabilization Trust 
LIHTC – Low Income Housing Tax Credit, created through the Tax Reform Act of 1986 
NSP – Neighborhood Stabilization Program (includes NSP1, NSP2, and NSP3) 
NSP1 – The first round of funding for NSP, $3.92 billion 
NSP2 – The second round of funding for NSP, $2 billion (included in ARRA: The American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009) 
NSP-TA – Technical Assistance, an appropriation of $50 million as part of NSP2 
NSP3 – The third round of funding for NSP, $1 billion (included in the Dodd–Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, passed in 2010)  
TA – Technical assistance, provided by HUD to grantees with funds appropriated under NSP2 
TARP – Troubled Assets Recovery Program, part of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act 
of 2008Nathaniel Decker    13 March 2011 
1 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
In 2007 the mortgage finance system in the US began to break apart. In 2007 1.2 million 
homeowners entered foreclosure. Banks foreclosed on 2 million more homes in 2008.
1 Misplaced 
confidence in housing markets had spurred investment, which bolstered prices, justifying 
increased investment. In late 2006 and 2007 this cycle began to reverse causing a huge increase in 
default and foreclosure rates. Foreclosures often led to abandonment, which further decreased 
property values and increased crime in neighborhoods. Immergluck and Smith calculated that 
every additional foreclosed property reduces property values by about 1 percent within an eighth 
mile of the foreclosure.
2 Increased crime and burdensome mortgages that were now more 
expensive than the homes themselves spurred more people to walk away from their mortgages.
3 
State and Federal governments responded with a set of programs and policies referred to as 
neighborhood stabilization. Neighborhood stabilization refers to a set of government 
interventions designed to stop cycles of disinvestment by preventing foreclosures and 
ameliorating the negative effects of foreclosed properties. 
A number of federal programs including the Home Affordable Modification Program 
(HAMP) and the Home Affordable Refinance Program (HARP) were designed to prevent future 
foreclosures. The federal government’s most significant response to deal with the negative effects 
of currently foreclosed properties was the Neighborhood Stabilization Program (NSP). NSP is a 
series of three HUD-administered block grant programs designed to lessen the severity of the 
foreclosure crisis. The program began with an appropriation of nearly $4 billion in the Housing 
                                                 
1  US Department of Housing and Urban Development. Interim Report to Congress on the Root Causes of the Foreclosure 
Crisis. Washington, DC: US Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2009. Web.  
2  Dan Immergluck and Geoff Smith. "The external costs of foreclosure: The impact of single-family mortgage 
foreclosures on property values." Housing Policy Debate 17.1 (2006): 69. Print. 
3  Thomas G. Kingsley, Robin Smith, and David Price. The Impacts of Foreclosures on Families and Communities. 
Washington, DC: The Urban Institute, 2009. Web. Nathaniel Decker    13 March 2011 
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and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (NSP1), and was funded again with $2 billion in 2009 
(NSP2), and $1 billion in 2010 (NSP3). The programs and basic characteristics of their grantees 
are summarized in Figure 1. Though these quantities are not enough to stabilize the nation’s 
housing markets, they may be enough to stabilize some neighborhoods in some municipalities.
4 
Each iteration of the program included a “set-aside” requirement stipulating that grantees spend 
25% of NSP funds to house families making less than 50% of the area median income (AMI). In 
mid-September 2010 the 18-month deadline for obligating NSP1 funds passed, presenting the 
opportunity for an early look at how grantees administered a new program in the midst of a 
crisis. This paper analyses the available documents and uses interviews with HUD administrators 
and grantees to probe a hypothesis: did suburban characteristics hinder grantees’ ability to satisfy 
their set-aside? 
 
                                                 
4  Harvard University. Joint Center for Housing Studies. "The State of the Nation's Housing." The State of the Nation's 
Housing. (2010) Print. Nathaniel Decker    13 March 2011 
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Figure 1: Description of NSP 1, 2, & 3 (adapted from stablecommunities.org)
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  NSP1  NSP2  NSP3 
Year    
Act passed in 2008 
(Division B, Title III of 
HERA of 2008) 
  
Announced and applications due 
in 2009 (Title XII of Division A of 
the ARRA). Awards announced 
2010. 
Passed July 2010 
(Financial Reform). 
Awards announced 
October 2010. 
Amount    $3.92 billion 
$2 billion ($50 million for technical 
assistance) 
 $1 billion (up to 2% for 
technical assistance) 
Methodology 
of Awards 
  
 
HUD provided grants to 
all states and selected 
local governments on a 
formula basis. 
 
Competitive application process 
open to local governments and 
nonprofits; collaborations were 
encouraged and could include 
private sector partners. Grantees 
were selected on the basis of 
foreclosure needs in their 
selected target areas, recent past 
experience, program design and 
compliance with NSP2 rules. 
  
Distributes funds by the 
formula allocation used for 
NSP1. 
Eligible Uses    
NSP funds may be used 
for activities which 
include, but are not 
limited to:  
  
• Establish financing 
mechanisms for purchase 
and redevelopment of 
foreclosed homes and 
residential properties. 
 
• Purchase and 
rehabilitate homes and 
residential properties 
abandoned or foreclosed. 
 
• Establish land banks for 
foreclosed homes. 
 
• Demolish blighted 
structures. 
 
•Redevelop demolished 
or vacant properties 
 Key Changes: 
• In April, 2010, HUD changed the 
definitions of “foreclosed” and 
“abandoned” for the purposes of 
identifying eligible properties for 
NSP1 and NSP2 to include 
properties where the mortgage is 
60 days delinquent or tax 
payments are at least 90 days 
delinquent. This allows for a 
property to be acquired through a 
short sale, and was intended to 
streamline the process of 
acquisition. Changes are 
retroactive to NSP1. 
Key Changes:  
• Funds available until 
expended. 
• Grantees have 2 years 
from the date HUD signs 
their grant agreements to 
expend 50% of the funds 
and 3 years to expend 
100%. 
• Establishes a minimum 
grant size of $1 million for 
cities and counties. 
• Permits redevelopment 
or rehab of “vacant” 
properties to qualify for the 
25% low-income set aside 
(previously only 
“abandoned or foreclosed” 
homes counted). 
                                                 
5 Neighborhood Stabilization Program (NSP) Strategies, 23 July 2010 2011, Neighborworks America, 4/19 2011 
<http://www.stablecommunities.org/nsp-strategies>. Nathaniel Decker    13 March 2011 
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  NSP1  NSP2  NSP3 
Number of 
Applicants 
  
  
N/A  482  N/A 
Number of 
Awards 
   309*  56  279 
Number of 
State 
Grantees 
   50  1
†  50 
Number of 
County 
Grantees 
  88  0
†  88 
Number of City 
Grantees 
  164  15
†  141 
Average Grant 
Size 
 
 
States: $40.8 million 
Counties: $9.2 million 
Cities: $6.4 million 
 
$30 million 
States: $5.9 million 
Counties: $3.5 million 
Cities: $2.7 million 
Deadlines    
Funds are to be obligated 
within 18 months of 
availability to recipient; 
and expended within 4 
years. 
Recipients must expend 50% of 
allocated funds within 2 years of 
the date funds are available to the 
recipient, and 100% of funds must 
be expended within 3 years. 
Grantees have 2 years 
from the date HUD signs 
their grant agreements to 
expend 50% of the funds 
and 3 years to expend 
100%. 
 * Number of awards differs from the sum of state, county, and city grantees because of grants to territorial governments. 
† Totals for NSP2 include only grantees that were solely state or city grantees. 3 awards went to nonprofits, but the majority of awards 
(37) went to consortia, many of which included state, county, and local governments. 
 
The hypothesis that suburban characteristics hindered NSP1 grantees’ ability to satisfy 
their set aside arose from the recognition that, though the foreclosure crisis hit many suburbs as 
hard as it hit urban areas, a number of factors may have hindered suburban grantees’ ability to 
satisfy their set-aside.
6,7 I identified four factors that may explain poor grantee performance with 
                                                 
6  Todd Swanstrom, et al. Regional resilience in the face of foreclosures : evidence from six metropolitan areas. Berkeley, CA: 
University of California, Institute of Urban and Regional Development, 2009. /z-wcorg/. Web. 
7 Elizabeth Strom. The Challenge: The Tampa Bay Region and the Foreclosure Crisis. Washington, DC: National League of 
Cities, 2010. Web. Nathaniel Decker    13 March 2011 
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the set-aside. I suspected that suburban municipal housing departments had less capacity (which I 
define as personnel and expertise) than their urban counterparts. Suburban grantees may have 
fewer foreclosed multifamily or rental properties, which would limit grantees’ ability to effectively 
satisfy their set-aside using rental strategies. While urban grantees might primarily be interested in 
using the set-aside to boost their stock of affordable housing, suburban grantees might not have 
this goal. Suburban jurisdictions generally have far fewer non-profits than urban jurisdictions, 
which would also reduce grantees’ ability to effectively obligate their set-asides.
8 
A cursory review of the literature supports the assumptions above. In their study on 
regional resilience in the face of the foreclosure crisis, Swanstrom, et al. show that suburban 
governments in St. Louis and Cleveland had less capacity compared to their central cities.
9 The 
2007 American Housing survey shows that approximately 50% of housing in central cities was 
multifamily, as opposed to only 30% of all housing in suburbs.
10 It is likely that this pattern would 
be reflected in the availability of single-family and multifamily foreclosed housing stock. In his 
review of the history of exclusionary zoning, Ihlanfeldt notes that this behavior has largely been 
the provenance of suburbs.
11 There are also many indications that housing nonprofit capacity is 
less in suburbs relative to central cities, though the extent of this difference varies by metro. 
Swanstrom et al. discuss intra-metro differences in housing nonprofit capacity in six metros. 
They show that housing nonprofits are heavily concentrated in the center cities of St. Louis and 
Cleveland and very thin in their suburbs.
12 The team identifies a slightly more even dispersion in 
                                                 
8 Mildred E. Warner. "Market-based Governance and the Challenge for Rural Governments: US Trends." Social Policy 
& Administration 40.6 (2006): 619. Web.Amir Hefetz and Mildred Warner. "Dynamics of Service Provision: Service, 
Market and Place Characteristics." Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 21.2 (2011): 19. Web. 
9 Swanstrom, et al. 
10 US Department of Housing and Urban Development and US Census Bureau. American Housing Survey for the United 
States: 2007., 2008. Web. 
11 K. R. Ihlanfeldt. "Exclusionary land-use regulations within suburban communities: A review of the evidence and 
policy prescriptions." Urban Studies 41.2 (2004): 261-83. Print. 
12 Swanstrom, et al. Nathaniel Decker    13 March 2011 
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San Francisco metro, but not in the Inland Empire. The team ends by noting that the city of 
Chicago has huge nonprofit capacity relative to suburbs, which have moderate capacity, while the 
Atlanta metro has very few housing nonprofits in its suburbs, but also has limited capacity in its 
urban center.
13 Additionally, Warner shows that in 2002 7% of a broad range of municipal 
services were delivered by nonprofits in urban areas, as opposed to 4% in suburban and rural 
areas, hinting at a capacity gap.
14  
I wanted to know if suburbs were ill-equipped to deal with NSP1 because many problems 
that were previously considered to be “urban problems,” such as poverty and distressed housing 
stock are now endemic to many suburbs.
15 NSP1 was based on the Community Development 
Block Grant program (CDBG), a program designed to help cities, particularly inner city areas. I 
was curious if cities could administer a block grant program like NSP more effectively than 
suburbs. What were the limitations of suburbs that block grant programs highlighted? Could 
these limitations be appropriately addressed with a different type of program, such as technical 
assistance provided by HUD? The $50 million allocated by HUD toward technical assistance in 
NSP 2 may have been a response to grantee needs that NSP1 made apparent. As urban problems 
spread to suburbs, what policies and programs can respond to these problems in this new 
environment? 
This study is based on a literature review and a series of interviews with two grantees in 
Florida and NSP administrators at HUD in Washington, DC. The study is far from 
comprehensive and is designed to raise issues to be probed with more in-depth studies. Though 
the study doesn’t allow for any conclusions about the program as a whole, the timing of the study 
                                                 
13 Swanstrom, et al. 
14 Warner. 
15  Robert Puentes and Jennifer S. Vey. The Federal Housing Policy Dilemma for Older Communities. Washington, DC: The 
Brookings Institution, 2007. Web. Nathaniel Decker    13 March 2011 
7 
 
does allow the interviewed grantees and HUD administrators to reflect on the obligation phase of 
NSP1, which recently passed its deadline in September 2010.  
  This paper is divided into 5 chapters. In Chapter 2 I review the published materials available 
on NSP1 to examine my hypothesis. In Chapter 3 I describe the methodology I used to approach 
my hypothesis, emphasizing how I structured my interviews. In Chapter 4 I discuss the findings 
of my interviews. In the last chapter I discuss promising aspects of NSP using broad policy 
recommendations to the federal government and discuss the significance of my findings and 
suggest further avenues of research. 
 
 
 Nathaniel Decker    13 March 2011 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
Introduction 
This chapter reviews the literature on NSP1 that relates to the four factors of interest. 
Because the program is so new it is difficult to come to any sweeping conclusions on the 
program based on themes in the literature. The literature itself consists of a handful of cursory 
studies, material from HUD itself (largely training materials, monitoring data, and regulations), 
and newspaper items on the program. This review is therefore primarily meant to complement 
and inform a series of interviews that I performed with suburban and urban grantees in Florida 
and HUD NSP1 administrators in Washington, DC. These interviews revealed how the 
characteristics of suburbs that I identified above affected how suburban grantees decided to fulfill 
their set-asides. This review is also designed to provide nationwide and statewide context to the 
grantees’ stories. 
 
HUD NSP1 Monitoring Data 
In order to assess whether grantees had difficulty obligating the set-aside I used two 
HUD data sources: the Disaster Recovery Grant Reporting system (DRGR) reported through 
HUD’s monthly snapshots of grantee performance and Quarterly Performance Reports (QPRs). 
Previous studies have largely relied on DRGR data, often by assessing the success of a grantee 
based on their progress obligating or spending their grant.
16,17 Reliance on these data is 
understandable. At the end of every month HUD released snapshots of every grantee’s 
                                                 
16 Ed Gramlich. Jurisdictions’ Compliance NSP1 Obligation Spend 25% of Funds for Very Low Income Household: Draft Report 
to the Annie E Casey Foundation. Washington, DC: National Low Income Housing Coalition, 2010. Print. 
17 Strom. Nathaniel Decker    13 March 2011 
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performance, highlighting their obligations and expenditures and assessing their progress toward 
obligation and expenditure targets (including the targets of the set-aside).
18 
DRGR data, however, was not always a reliable indicator of grantees’ performance over 
time. DRGR was a new system for local administrators, who were accustomed to reporting 
CDBG and HOME expenditures to HUD using the Integrated Disbursement & Information 
System (IDIS). Inexperience with DRGR led to inaccurate reporting, particularly in the early 
stages of the program.
19 There were also problems with standardized reporting with DRGR. A 
researcher at the National Low Income Housing Coalition found that while most grantees 
counted obligations toward units they expected to house very-low-income families, Birmingham, 
Alabama did not count funds to the set-aside until units were occupied by very-low-income 
families. Because of this unconventional definition Birmingham remained at 0% until three 
months from the September deadline. The city eventually reported obligating 35% of their grant 
to the set-aside, and had spent 17% of the grant to the set-aside by the end of November 
2010.
20,21 HUD itself may have been misled by inaccurate and inconsistent reporting when it 
announced in May of 2010 that it expected to recapture up to $1 billion of unspent funds from 
NSP1.
22 By September, Secretary Donovan reported that all but $300 million of NSP1 had been 
obligated, and that the Department was abandoning plans for recapturing funds.
23 
                                                 
18 Snapshot Reports, 30 Nov. 2010 2010, 10 Dec. 2010 2010 
<http://hudnsphelp.info/index.cfm?do=viewSnapshotHome>. 
19 Ed Gramlich. Personal Interview., 2010. Web. 
20 Gramlich. 
21 Birmingham, AL NSP-1 grantee Report Nov 2010, 30 Nov. 2010 2010, US Department of Housing and Urban 
Development, 12/13 2010 <http://hudnsphelp.info/media/snapshots/11-30-2010/1GR-BIRM_AL-R04-BIR-
11302010.pdf>. 
22 Obama Administration Supports Additional Funding to Stabilize Neighborhoods Hard-Hit by Foreclosure, May 
18, 2010, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 10/25 2010 
<http://portal.hud.gov/portal/page/portal/HUDMobile/pressreleases/2010/HUDNo.10-103>. 
23 Shaun Donovan. Prepared Remarks of Secretary Shaun Donovan at the Federal Reserve Board REO Summit: "Vacant Property, 
Strategies for Neighborhood Stabilization". Speech_09012010 Vol. , 2010. Web. Nathaniel Decker    13 March 2011 
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Hints of the effectiveness of grantee set-aside strategies can be gleaned from the 
Quarterly Performance Reports (QPRs) that HUD required of its grantees. These reports go into 
more detail than the information posted on DRGR, and must be approved by HUD field offices, 
improving their accuracy. Though QPRs varied widely in the level of detail grantees that 
provided and HUD field officers had limited resources to check their accuracy, they are one of 
the best sources of data on grantee progress.
24 QPRs can not only provide a broad picture of how 
grantees expected to obligate grant money over the 18-month period, they frequently describe the 
affordability requirements of the grantee’s set-aside. 
Neither HERA nor the regulations released by HUD set rigorous affordability standards 
for the set-aside. The regulations issued by HUD stated only that “grantees shall ensure, to the 
maximum extent practicable and for the longest feasible term, that the sale, rental, or 
redevelopment of … homes and residential properties … remain affordable to individuals or 
families,” and established HOME standards as the minimum for “affordable rents.”
25 A National 
Low Income Housing Coalition study, examining a selection of 56 grantees’ QPRs, discovered 
widely varying definitions of affordability and periods of affordability.
26 In Vermont, for example, 
“affordable rents” meant less than 30% of a family adjusted gross income, and the state 
incorporated the goal of permanent affordability into its subgrantee selection process. Other 
grantees used the HOME minimum prescribed by HUD (the lesser of the Fair Market Rent or 
30% of 65% of AMI, almost guaranteeing that very-low-income families would be paying more 
                                                 
24 Gramlich. 
25 US Department of Housing and Urban Development. "Notice of Allocations, Application Procedures, Regulatory 
Waivers Granted to and Alternative Requirements for Emergency Assistance for Redevelopment of Abandoned and 
Foreclosed Homes Grantees Under the Housing and Economic Recovery Act, 2008." Federal Register 73.194 (2008): 
58334. Web. 
26 Gramlich. Nathaniel Decker    13 March 2011 
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than 30% of their income on housing) and set periods of affordability as low as five to ten 
years.
27 Many grantees did not describe their definitions of affordability in their QPRs. 
HUD’s program monitoring data can hint at the effectiveness of grantees’ set-asides. A 
detailed analysis of QPRs in particular could produce some conclusions about the program as a 
whole. All 309 grantees have released five QPRs so far, creating a vast trove of detailed data, 
including data on how grantees planned to satisfy their set-asides. Such an analysis would be 
time-consuming, however, and these data generally do not describe the decision-making 
processes and difficulties of administering NSP1. The next section will discuss studies that have 
taken close looks at QPRs and can provide some indications of how grantees administered NSP1 
grants and set-asides. 
 
Early evaluations of NSP1 
Enterprise Community Partners conducted the earliest study of NSP1, examining a 
selection of grantees’ plans to spend NSP1 funds. HUD required that grantees submit these plans 
(called “action plan substantial amendments” in the language of CDBG) for approval before they 
could receive funding.
28 Enterprise examined these plans looking for “promising approaches.” 
This study is useful in that it is one of very few studies that has critically analyzed NSP1 grantee 
actions. Its most obvious limitation is that it was released in April 2009, only one month into 
grantees’ obligation period, and thus only examines grantees’ plans to spend NSP monies, not 
their actual choices and actions. The study is also not ideal because, in an effort to identify the 
                                                 
27 Gramlich. 
28 US Department of Housing and Urban Development. Nathaniel Decker    13 March 2011 
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most promising approaches, larger grantees were over-represented in the study sample.
29 The 
study thus doesn’t directly address my focus: difficulties with the set-aside, particularly with 
smaller suburban grantees. It is does, however, provide a rare picture of how grantees expected to 
use NSP1 funds, and hints at problems in the program that would prove to be significant. 
In March of 2010 Elizabeth Strom, a professor of geography at the University of South 
Florida, produced a brief study on the foreclosure crisis around Tampa Bay for the National 
League of Cities.
30 The study outlines the patterns of the foreclosure crisis and examines the 
response of different levels of government. Because of my plans to conduct interviews in Florida 
the study is quite useful. It not only describes the foreclosure crisis in the Tampa Bay area in 
terms of suburban and urban areas, it also describes the nonprofit infrastructure, the diversity of 
foreclosed housing type and tenure, and the capacity of municipal governments to administer 
NSP1 grants. The major weakness of the study is lack of a detailed methodology. Because 
sources are not cited, examination of Strom’s conclusions is difficult. The study is still quite 
valuable, however, because of its focus on Florida, and because it is one of the few studies to 
examine NSP1 during the 18-month obligation period.  
The last significant study of NSP1 that this paper relies on was produced by Ed 
Gramlich, the Regulatory Director/State Partner Liaison for the National Low Income Housing 
Coalition.
31 The study was produced for the Annie E. Casey Foundation in the summer of 2010, 
and examined the progress of grantees across the nation as of March 2010. The study focused on 
the set-aside requirement of NSP1, and relied heavily on both DRGR and QPR data. The study 
was limited by problems with DRGR and QPR data outlined above, and because it examined 
                                                 
29 Amanda Sheldon, et al, The Challenge of Foreclosed Properties: An Analysis of State and Local Plans to use the 
Neighborhood Stabilization Program (Columbia, MD: Enterprise Community Partners, Inc., 2009) 10. 
30 Strom. 
31 Gramlich. Nathaniel Decker    13 March 2011 
13 
 
only 56 of the 259 city and county grantees and only eight of the fifty state grantees. The study 
was still extremely valuable as it is the only assessment so far that examined the set-aside 
requirement in detail. 
 
Problems with NSP1 Identified by Early Studies 
Observers noted a number of difficulties with NSP1 in the program’s early stages. The 
Enterprise report described three “tensions” in NSP1.
32 The first tension noted was between the 
need for grantees to produced detailed plans, and the three month time frame that HUD gave 
grantees to produce the action plans. This short time frame diminished the quality of the action 
plans by limiting the range of resources that the grantees could consult to produce the plans. One 
of the few groups that attempted to improve grantees’ action plans was NCB Capital Impact, a 
national non-profit community development organization. They commissioned Burlington 
Associates to produce materials encouraging grantees to pursue shared-equity strategies and 
included sample language for their action plans.
33 This report was released in late October, near 
the December 1 deadline for grantees to submit their plans to HUD. The Enterprise team, 
though, wrote that reports like this had limited impact because of very short time frame to 
produce action plans imposed by HUD.  They described grantees producing action plans “in 
isolation and with limited awareness of how other NSP grantees were thinking about using NSP 
funds.”
34 
After giving grantees three months to produce a plan of how to spend millions of dollars, 
HUD imposed an 18 month deadline for grantees to obligate the funds. HUD defined obligation 
                                                 
32 Sheldon, et al. 
33 Rick Jacobus, Heather Gould, and Barbara Kautz. Preserving Affordability of NSP Funded Foreclosed Properties., 2008. 
Web. 
34 Sheldon, et al. Nathaniel Decker    13 March 2011 
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in its regulations as “when orders are placed, contracts are awarded, services are received, and 
similar transactions have occurred that require payment by the [grantee or subgrantee].”
35 Both 
the Enterprise team and Georgia Tech professor Dan Immergluck recognized that this short time 
frame would limit grantees’ ability to leverage NSP1 by finding funds to match the grants.
36,37 
This lack of time to leverage funds is especially harmful to grantees’ effectively satisfying their 
set-aside requirement. Very-low income populations often require subsidies for affordable rents. 
Though NSP1 could be used for down payment assistance and soft second mortgages, it could 
not be used for rent subsidy. Grantees that chose to satisfy their set-aside by acquiring and 
rehabbing units designed to be rented to very-low income families thus needed to look elsewhere 
to line up sources of funding to subsidize these rents. My interviews included questions about 
where grantees looked for funds and how this limitation on NSP1 money influenced their choice 
of how to obligate their set-aside. In NSP2 HUD recognized this issue and included ability to 
leverage funds as one of its criteria for awarding grants.
38 
The last tension the Enterprise team identified was need to target funds to the neediest 
areas, and the stigma that of being targeted as a needy area.
39 Strom also noted this problem, and 
a review of newspapers in Florida showed the prescience of the Enterprise team. This problem 
will be discussed in detail later in the paper. 
HUD’s restrictions on what properties NSP1 funds could be used on was one of the 
biggest initial problems of the program. HUD required that grantees limit spending to properties 
                                                 
35 US Department of Housing and Urban Development. 
36 Daniel Immergluck. Foreclosed : high-risk lending, deregulation, and the undermining of America's mortgage market. Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2009. Print. 
37 Sheldon, et al. 
38 US Department of Housing and Urban Development. Notice of Fund Availability (NOFA) for the Neighborhood 
Stabilization Program 2 under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, 2009. Docket No. FR-5321-N-01 Vol. , 2009. 
Web. 
39 Sheldon, et al. Nathaniel Decker    13 March 2011 
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that were either “foreclosed” or “abandoned.” Properties were “foreclosed” only if they had 
completed the foreclosure process. Properties were “abandoned” only if “mortgage or tax 
foreclosure proceedings have been initiated for that property, no mortgage or tax payments have 
been made by the property owner for at least 90 days, AND the property has been vacant for at 
least 90 days” (emphasis original).
40 Under these definitions grantees could not spend NSP 
money on properties abandoned by owners, but still occupied by tenants. In addition some 
grantees felt they could more effectively stabilize neighborhoods by providing assistance to 
owner-occupied properties rather than foreclosed ones.
41 HUD’s definitions made working with 
multifamily properties especially difficult. Many problematic multifamily properties were financed 
by Fannie Mae, which rarely initiated foreclosure proceedings against delinquent lendees unless 
they had confirmed a buyer for the foreclosed property. Thus many grantees were unable to use 
NSP funds on deteriorating multifamily units owned by delinquent lendees because they did not 
have an established relationship with Fannie Mae.
42 
HUD, responding to grantees, liberalized its definitions of “abandoned” and “foreclosed” 
properties in early April of 2010 for all three iterations of NSP. The new definitions allowed 
grantees to consider as “foreclosed” any property that was “at least 60 days delinquent on its 
mortgage and the owner has been notified; or the property owner is 90 days or more delinquent 
on tax payments” or on any property where foreclosure proceedings had begun.
43 The definition 
of “abandoned” properties was revised to include “homes where no mortgage or tax payments 
have been made by the property owner for at least 90 days or a code enforcement inspection has 
determined that the property is not habitable and the owner has taken no corrective actions 
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within 90 days of notification of the deficiencies.”
44 These decisions helped many grantees, but 
the relatively late revision may still have diminished the success of the program.
45 
The tortuous process of foreclosure in many states also hindered grantees’ ability to 
acquire properties with NSP funds. In states with judicial foreclosure, such as Florida, the average 
foreclosure process took a year.
46 Cumbersome foreclosure processes had the potential to limit 
the effectiveness of NSP in nearly every state.
47 
Even when properties were eligible for NSP dollars, HUD stipulated that foreclosed or 
abandoned properties be acquired at a “minimum discount of 5 percent for each residential 
property purchased with NSP funds and a minimum average discount [of 10%] for all properties 
acquired with NSP funds over the 18-month HERA use period.”
48 This stipulation hindered 
grantees’ ability to acquire NSP-eligible properties in speculative housing markets.
49 Elizabeth 
Strom noted that a still-strong speculative market may have contributed to Tampa’s inability to 
purchase any properties with NSP1 funds by January, 2010.
50 The Palm Beach Post reported that 
Palm Beach County also experienced this problem.
51 
The pace of the program and HUD’s restrictive definitions may have been the result of 
NSP being a foreclosure-crisis response program. These two problems hint at the larger tension 
between designing NSP to respond to the foreclosure crisis, and designing an effective affordable 
housing or community development program. One of NSP’s goals was to release money quickly 
into the housing market to lessen the impact of the real estate bust. This goal was the rationale 
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for the pace of spending and the stipulation that funds could only be spent on foreclosed 
properties. This goal was not in consonance with the goals of community development, which is 
predicated on continued support and the formation of partnerships within communities. 
 
 
Potential Problems with Grantee Capacity 
Observers also identified grantees’ lack of capacity as a problem in the program’s early 
stages. Many of the “promising approaches” identified by Enterprise (such as construction of 
rental housing with Low Income Housing Tax Credits and supportive housing) required 
nonprofit partners.
52 NCB Capital Impact’s report made this point explicitly regarding 
community land trusts: “a jurisdiction must already have an existing land trust or a community 
based nonprofit housing organization that is willing to act as a land trust.”
53 In a webinar to new 
grantees on October 2, 2008 the Brookings Institution researcher Alan Mallach predicted that 
many grantees would have limited capacity to effectively administer NSP grants, and recommend 
that grantees “seek out capacity wherever it can be found.”
54 
The early evaluations of NSP1 suggest that the concerns about grantee capacity were 
justified. Ed Gramlich found that states had obligated a higher percentage to the set-aside than 
counties, and counties had obligated more than local governments, hinting at capacity issues.
55 He 
also found that small grantees had generally obligated fewer funds to the set-aside than larger 
jurisdictions. Only about 30% of small grantees had obligated more than 20% of their grant to 
their set-aside by June 30. Medium-sized grantees had obligated 56%, large grantees 69% and 
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very large grantees 50%.
56 Examining grantees in the Tampa Bay area, Elizabeth Strom noted that 
“local governments tend to have extremely limited community development and affordable 
housing capacity; they do not have the robust staffing or institutional capacity to develop 
innovative programs in response to an unexpected turn of events.”
57 I intend to probe these 
capacity issues in my interviews. 
HUD also appeared to recognize the inadequacy of many grantees’ capacity to effectively 
use their grants. As the deadline for obligation of NSP1 funds passed, HUD changed its policy 
about recapturing unspent funds. On 27 August 2010 HUD issued a notice in the Federal 
Register stating that it would not recapture unused funds so as “to limit the negative effects on 
communities that, although they may not have had the capacity to meet the deadline, still have 
great need for neighborhood stabilization funding.”
58 
 
Potential Problems with Grantees’ Partnerships with Nonprofits 
From very early in the program HUD recognized that nonprofits would be critical to help 
grantees gain capacity. Beginning with the notice of NSP1 in the Federal Register, HUD 
emphasized the importance of partnering with nonprofits, specifying how funds could be used in 
partnerships.
59 HUD also emphasized the importance of nonprofits in workshops and webinars. 
By late 2009 HUD had opened these events to nonprofit partners to help build partnerships. In a 
workshop held by HUD on 15 January 2010, the presenter specifically referred to building the 
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capacity of the nonprofit partners of the grantees.
60 The early webinar by Alan Mallach also 
emphasized the importance of nonprofit partners.
61 
Foreseeing the need of grantees for assistance from the nonprofit sector, a group of six 
large national community development nonprofits formed the National Community Stabilization 
Trust (NCST) to ease the transfer of Real Estate Owned (REO) properties to new owners and 
renters with NSP1.
62 NCST provided two important services to grantees. The First Look 
Program allowed grantees to inspect and acquire abandoned and foreclosed properties before 
they became available to other buyers. The Targeted Bulk Purchase Program allowed grantees to 
buy dozens of properties from sellers in one transaction.
63 Though these services were available 
to al NSP1 grantees, it’s likely that grantees with greater nonprofit capacity used these services 
more frequently. Specifically, it’s reasonable to expect that grantees who partnered with 
nonprofits who were members of the organizations that came together to form NCST used these 
programs at higher rates. 
There are signs that grantees who did partner with nonprofits were able to use their NSP 
grants more effectively. Ed Gramlich found a correlation between the extent to which 
subgrantees of states partnered with nonprofits and that state’s progress on the set-aside. 
Strikingly, only about half of the formula grantees he surveyed had partnered with nonprofits.
64 
Looking at the Tampa Bay area, Elizabeth Strom found that non-profit infrastructure and 
foundations to fund community development were extremely weak, which hindered grantees’ 
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ability to obligate funds to NSP.
65 Conversely she identified Pasco County as a strong NSP 
grantee because of the partnerships the County had already established before 2008. Describing 
the ways in which Pasco CDCs worked with real estate agents, she wrote, “NSP 1 has therefore 
[been more effective in Pasco County] because it involved adding to the scope of this 
partnership, rather than creating new relationships.”
66 One can easily imagine this holding true 
for nonprofit partnerships as well. Grantees selected for NSP webinars emphasized their 
partnerships with nonprofits. In a webinar organized by Enterprise all three grantees were 
represented by their nonprofit partners. These partners ranged from Case Western University, 
which provided a sophisticated foreclosed and abandoned property identification and analysis 
system, to Mercy Housing in Chicago, which acquired, rehabbed, and managed large foreclosed 
multifamily buildings using NSP grants.
67 
Despite Ed Gramlich’s finding that only half of grantees partnered with nonprofits there 
are also hints that nonprofits were widely used during the obligation phase of NSP1. In a speech 
given 1 September 2010, Secretary of HUD Shaun Donovan spoke at length about the 
effectiveness of NCST. The secretary ended the speech by announcing a new partnership 
between NCST and a group of banks that together held 75% of the nation’s REO property.
68 
This is a sign that NCST worked at least fairly well during NSP1. Neighborworks partners were 
also regularly tapped.
69 It remains to be seen, however, how prevalent nonprofit partnerships 
were during NSP1. 
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Potential Problems with Grantee Obligations to Rental Housing 
  Early in the program HUD and NSP1 observers predicted and recommended that grantees 
use a mix of rental and homeownership strategies to obligate their funds. While homeownership 
seemed to be an appropriate strategy for the 50-120% AMI populations where the majority of 
funds would be obligated, rental strategies seemed best suited for the set-aside. In a training video 
released in September 2009 HUD recommended that grantees pursue rental strategies to satisfy 
their set-aside.
70 HUD reiterated this recommendation in subsequent problem solving clinics.
71 
The Enterprise report not only recommended that grantees satisfy their set-asides using rental 
strategies, but predicted that the vast majority of grantees would do so.
72 They based this 
prediction on the fact that about 28% of funds were expected to go to rental housing in their 
sample. The report also states that HUD found that 75% of all grantees planned to use rental 
housing to satisfy the set-aside.
73 
Early signs, however, suggested that many grantees were only pursuing homeownership 
strategies, even for the set-aside. Ed Gramlich’s study found that only about half of the formula 
grantees he surveyed were using rental strategies to satisfy their set-asides.
74 Furthermore, 
examining the extent to which the grantees obligated funds to the set-asides, he found that those 
grantees who were using homeownership strategies were having at least as much success 
satisfying their set-asides as those who also employed rental strategies.
75 He also noted a vast 
difference between state grantees’ strategies. Connecticut and Minnesota planned to satisfy their 
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set-asides primarily with homeownership (83% and 99.9% respectively), while Vermont and 
Florida only used rental strategies. Gramlich found that states that used a mix of ownership and 
rental strategies had obligated the most funds.
76 
There are a number of potential reasons for the apparent disparity between the 
recommendations and expectations of HUD and Enterprise and the apparently prevalent use of 
homeownership strategies. A dearth of foreclosed and abandoned housing stock suitable for 
rental may have been a factor. During the January 2010 problem solving clinic a participant stated 
that the majority of eligible units in his jurisdiction were scattered single family units, which 
would be extremely difficult to manage as rental properties. He stated that rental strategies were 
only feasible with 25 units or more, and that the short time frame of the grant made it impossible 
to assemble this many units.
77 The presence of foreclosed multifamily properties appears to be an 
important factor in the use of rental strategies. A participant in an Enterprise webinar stated that 
Chicago was able to satisfy its set-aside fairly easily because they had a few large multifamily 
properties (including many failed condo conversions). These properties were acquired, rehabbed 
and transferred to Mercy Housing, a large nonprofit community development organization in the 
city.
78 
It is also possible that the Enterprise study, as it over-sampled large grantees and the rust 
belt, may have depicted a skewed picture of grantees’ plans. Many suburban grantees were quite 
small and probably had far fewer large multifamily rental properties in foreclosure, if they had 
any. It is also possible that grantees were unable to fulfill their grants in the way they intended, or 
changed their strategy for other reasons. Grantees also may have had more experience with 
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homeownership than rental. These hypotheses will be probed during my interviews with 
grantees. 
 
NSP1 in Florida 
This study focuses on Florida because Florida grantees received more NSP1 funds than 
the grantees of any other state. Approximately 15% of all NSP1 funds went to Florida grantees, 
totaling about $540 million. This allocation was the result of the extent of Florida’s foreclosure 
crisis. On a state level, the Florida real estate bubble expanded faster and became more 
overinflated than other states, and caused more destruction when it burst. It has been argued that 
the state government and local governments in Florida are dependent on real estate development 
for revenue.
79 Florida also was chosen because of the state’s varied affordable housing capacity. 
There are signs that governments in Florida have significant capacity to administer affordable 
housing programs. Not only does Florida have a comprehensive planning law that requires that 
local governments produce a detailed housing element, they also have distributed over $700 
million since 1992 to local governments to preserve and construct housing affordable to 
moderate to very-low income families.
80 On the other hand, because of the explosive growth in 
the population of the state in the past few decades, and the short durations of housing busts, 
local governments may be inexperienced in dealing with the problems of widespread foreclosure 
and weak housing markets. I was curious how local governments that were home to some of the 
worst foreclosure problems in the nation, and had no prior experience with widespread 
foreclosures, administered a large foreclosure-response program. 
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To get a more detailed impression of how NSP functioned in Florida I examined Florida 
newspapers for articles referring to NSP using Factiva. The articles do not provide insight into 
internal workings of the grantees and their decisions-making processes, and at best reveal only 
grantees’ final decisions. Newspaper coverage also may be spotty geographically, with some areas 
receiving more detailed coverage than others. Newspapers are, however, one of the few sources 
available that give a locally-oriented perspective on NSP. In my review of newspapers I’ve 
focused my attention on the quotes of grantees to limit the distortion that is often present in 
newspaper articles. This review of newspapers is meant to provide a perspective on how NSP1 
worked in Florida. I reviewed papers across the state to provide a broad picture of the 
foreclosure crisis and NSP1 in Florida. 
Some Florida grantees were wary of NSP when HUD launched the program in late 2008. 
The Sarasota NSP administrator was concerned that after acquiring and rehabbing properties her 
office would “be left holding the bag” with no potential buyers for the NSP properties.
81 Volusia 
County administrators expressed similar concerns. Speaking in late 2010 the Volusia County 
Community Services Director said “this was a program that Volusia County and the cities across 
Florida and across the United States were not well-suited for. We were not geared up to get in the 
real estate business and make this program successful under the federal guidelines. … In the early 
stages of this program, I almost wish we hadn’t gotten this money.”
82 Part of this wariness may 
have come from the size of the grants. Pasco County officials expected to receive $4 million, and 
were “shocked” when HUD allocated $19.5 million to the county.
83  
                                                 
81 Zac Anderson, "Florida Waits On A Promise," Sarasota Herald-Tribune 15 February 2009 2009, , sec. A: . 
82 Will Hobson, "Volusia officials: Federal cash helps county buy, sell foreclosed homes," Daytona Beach News 
Journal 22 October 2010 2010, , sec. C: . 
83 Kevin Wiatrowski, "Aid For Housing Surprises Officials," Tampa Tribune 18 October 2008 2008, : . Nathaniel Decker    13 March 2011 
25 
 
  Grantee concerns about capacity appeared to be justified in at least one case. A September 
2010 HUD audit revealed that Polk County NSP administrators violated HUD procurement 
rules in contracting with a private company to help manage NSP. The HUD audit stated that 
“the number and significance of the procurement violations ... [brought] into question the 
County’s capacity to implement future NSP activities in accordance with competitive contracting 
requirements.”
84 According to an official at Neighborworks who was in close contact with 
housing nonprofits in Florida during NSP1, small grantees also struggled with capacity problems, 
frequently asking for assistance from Florida Neighborworks members.
85  
Problems with foreclosed property acquisition appeared common for grantees in Florida, 
where the speculative residential real estate market was still hot. Nearly a year into the 18-month 
obligation period Palm Beach County had not acquired any foreclosed properties after being 
routinely outbid by speculative investors.
86 In addition to the regulations requiring grantees to 
purchase properties at discounts, grantees were at a disadvantage to speculative investors because 
of the 30 pages of paperwork HUD required sellers to fill out, and because grantees were 
generally unable to pay in cash, as NSP was a reimbursement program. Coral Springs certified 52 
buyers but was unable to purchase any homes by June 2009 because sellers preferred cash 
buyers.
87 
  NSP1 also faced political problems in Florida. Some grantees faced resistance to the 
program’s support of affordable housing. The Palm Coast City Manager introduced the program 
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by stating that NSP was not a “low-income public housing” program.
88 NSP administrators in 
Indian River County made the news by refusing to reveal the identities of families benefiting 
from NSP funds. Explaining this decision, the director of a nonprofit housing company stated, 
“if I didn’t have people come to my office and ask, ‘Why are you moving those people into my 
neighborhood? Can’t you find someplace else?’ I might not be so paranoid.” The director also 
stated that NSP properties had been vandalized and that resentful neighbors had left dog feces 
on the front steps of one rehabbed home.
89 Marion County Commissioners were also hostile to 
the goals of the program. One commissioner stated that NSP was “another example of us taking 
a department and doing the things that private enterprise can.”
90 Pasco County Realtors also 
resisted NSP, arguing more money be allocated to downpayment assistance from the acquisition 
and rehab budget. Pasco County administrators bowed to the Realtors’ requests, but found that 
the demand for downpayment assistance was far less than they expected, and eventually re-
allocated funds to acquisition and rehab.
91 
  By the end of the 18-month deadline however, newspapers reported that grantees had been 
able to make some difference using NSP1 money. Hillsborough County, which lost $2 million in 
HOME funds after a damning HUD audit in 2008, received a positive HUD audit in 2010 for the 
County’s administration of NSP1.
92 Though Palm Beach County had a “sputtering start,” it was 
able to obligate its entire NSP1 grant by the 18-month deadline. A Palm Beach County official 
stated that though “we were having trouble at first, [and] it was definitely a challenge to match 
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buyers with homes” the county eventually obligated funds to assist 81 properties.
93 Even the 
officials in Volusia County who were concerned that the program would be more trouble than it 
was worth concluded that, “at the end of the day, we have made this program work. I think this 
is an outstanding example of what this county can accomplish.”
94 
 
Conclusion 
  My hypothesis that suburban grantees were less successful obligating their set-asides 
compared to urban grantees has some support in the literature. Grantee capacity, nonprofit 
partnerships, presence of foreclosed multifamily rental housing, and politically fraught goals all 
appear to have been at work (at least in Florida) during the 18-month obligation period for 
NSP1. The literature, however, rarely describes these factors in terms of an urban/suburban 
difference. Though a Neighborworks manager agreed that small grantees were at a big 
disadvantage compared to larger grantees, she stated that Miami was probably not a good 
example of an effective grantee, mentioning severe bureaucratic and political problems with their 
administration of NSP1.
95 It is possible that I have identified important factors to NSP1 success, 
but that they are not correlated to an urban/suburban difference as I had expected. 
The literature also reveals a number of questions that can be approached in my interviews 
with grantees. Because the literature does not reveal the magnitude of the five factors, I could ask 
grantees what factors limited them the most. The literature suggests that some grantees faced 
significant political pressure that influenced grantee set-aside decisions. It would be interesting to 
see how political pressure both within government and from the outside influenced grantee goals 
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for the set-aside. Lastly, the review sharpens my questions to grantees: instead of asking how the 
short time-frame affected their set-aside, I can be more specific and ask how the short time 
impaired their ability to find matching funds to subsidize renters for the set-aside. Nathaniel Decker    13 March 2011 
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
 
NSP1 disbursed $4 billion to 309 grantees (which included states, territories, counties and 
localities) from Guam to Maine. In lieu of attempting to come to any conclusions about the 
program as whole, this methodology was designed to probe a specific research question: did 
NSP1 grantees have difficulty fulfilling their set-aside because of their suburban attributes? 
Though NSP2 and NSP3 affected the administration of NSP1 grants, this study is limited to the 
administration of NSP1 grants. This chapter describes the conceptual framework that bounded 
and focused this study, and describes the methods I used to construct interview schedules and 
select interviewees. 
This study used two scales of analysis: a national look at the problems that grantees had with 
their set-asides, and a detailed look at the local level - how one urban and one suburban grantee 
administered their NSP1 grants, with particular attention to their set-asides. The national 
perspective came from a literature review and interviews with HUD staff, other NSP researchers, 
and national nonprofits, including TA providers and nonprofit partners. (A complete list of 
interviews with dates and the job titles of the interviewees is included as Appendix A.) The 
national perspective shows the successes and challenges of NSP as a program and provides 
context to the stories of the two local grantees. The two grantees show what these successes and 
challenges look like on the ground. “Capacity,” for example, is a term that refers to a wide range 
of grantee attributes. The stories of the two grantees are included to help clarify what a national-
scale problem like “a lack of capacity” means in the context of NSP.  
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Figure 2: Conceptual Framework for Study 
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Conceptual framework 
I constructed the conceptual framework above based on Miles and Huberman’s 
recomendations in Qualitative Data Analysis.
96 The framework centered on the process that I was 
interested in: the series of grantee decisions regarding how they chose to satisfy their set-aside. 
These decisions were influenced by the requirements of the set-aside as articluated by HERA and 
HUD regulations and the four factors that I suspect vary between urban and suburban grantees. 
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The decisions that grantees made affect the outcomes of their set-aside. I intend to discover 
the character of grantee’s difficulties by examining the success of grantees’ set-aside strategies. 
What plans did grantees have to abandon because they were unfeasible? Were there instances of 
wasted time or resources when planning to obligate money to the set-aside? I’m also curious 
about how grantees chose to define affordability. HUD’s regulations suggest that grantees should 
“ensure [affordability] to the maximum extent practicable and for the longest feasible term,” but 
these definitions varied widely by grantee.
97 
 
Discussion of Research Methods 
I chose to approach these research questions using interviews with grantees and HUD 
because I wanted a small, detailed picture of how a few grantees administered their NSP1 grants. 
I made this decision partially because this was such a new program, and because I wanted an 
insider’s view on the program. In order to test my hypothesis I needed to understand the factors 
that influenced how grantees obligated money to their set-asides. Because the program is so new 
I couldn’t understand the decisions of the grantees simply by using resources in the library or on 
the Internet. I decided that the most direct way to understand how these decisions were made 
was to talk to the people who made them.  
To provide a detailed picture of how grantees administered NSP1, I interviewed two 
grantees in Florida: Brevard County and Miami. Brevard is a suburban county, with a high 
homeownership rate (75%) and few multifamily homes (12% of all units in structures of 10 units 
or more).
98,99  Miami is an urban city, with a homeownership rate of approximately half of 
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Brevard’s, and large amount of multifamily housing (41%).
100,101 These data do not reveal the mix 
of properties available to the grantees, however, as NSP funds could only be used on foreclosed 
or abandoned properties. Brevard has 50% more residents than Miami, and 1/3 more housing 
units. Miami, though, was harder hit by the foreclosure crisis, receiving a grant of $12.1 million, 
while Brevard received $5.3 million. The average NSP1 grant for counties and cities in Florida 
was $9.4 million. 
Miami was the obvious candidate for an urban grantee, as it was hit extremely hard by the 
foreclosure crisis and received one of the largest grants given to a Florida city, approximately 
42% of which went to the set-aside. I was able to schedule an interview with the administrator 
for NSP for the city of Miami, Ann Kashmer, on 13 January 2011. 
To identify suburban grantees that had difficulty with the set-aside I initially used August and 
September snapshots of DRGR data. I used obligation rate to the set-aside as an indicator of the 
difficulty that grantees had with the set-aside. Grantees needed to obligate at least 25% of their 
grant to the set-aside 18 months after they received their grants. This deadline fell between the 
end of August and mid-September, varying by grantee. I assumed that grantees that had not 
obligated at least 23% of their funds to their set-aside by the end of August had had trouble 
fulfilling this requirement. Using the monthly snapshots available on the HUD NSP website, I 
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looked at grantees that had obligated less than 23% by the end of August. 44 grantees (14% of all 
grantees) fit this criterion.
102 
From this list I selected two suburban grantees as potential interviewees: Deerfield Beach 
and Coral Springs. During January of 2011 I attempted to contact these two grantees by email 
and phone, but never got responses to my phone and email messages. In mid-January I went to 
Washington, DC to interview the HUD NSP team, and was told that the NSP team for Deerfield 
Beach was recently fired and was currently under investigation for misuse of NSP funds.
103 At 
this point I changed my strategy and asked HUD personnel for recommendations of suburban 
grantees in South Florida that had difficulty with the NSP1 set-aside. I was told that the City of 
Palm Bay and Palm Beach County both fit my criteria, and I began to email and call them. The 
NSP administrator from the City of Palm Bay declined to be interviewed. After numerous 
discussions with various staff at in Palm Beach County throughout February 2011 I was unable 
to schedule an interview with the administrator of the program there. 
I then expanded my search for suburban grantees that struggled with the set-aside to all of 
Florida. HUD staff recommended that I look at Brevard County. This recommendation was 
intriguing, because though Brevard County was hit very hard by the foreclosure crisis and 
received a large NSP1 grant, the grant was relatively small given the number of households in the 
County. Pasco County, for example, was ¾ the size of Brevard, yet received a grant more than 
three times larger than Brevard. I had assumed that larger counties would be more capacity to 
administer NSP1 grants, and Brevard had potential to challenge this assumption. Lastly, Brevard 
was a good candidate for a suburban grantee, as its largest urbanized area, Palm Bay, was only 
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barely 100,000. I was able to schedule an interview with the Brevard County NSP administrator, 
Paula Davis. 
Though I had initially wanted to select a high-performing urban grantee and an under-
performing suburban grantee to highlight the differences that I was interested in, the grantees do 
not fit into these typologies perfectly. Both grantees had very low obligation rates by December 
2009, causing HUD to send technical assistance providers to conduct needs assessments. HUD 
had categorized both grantees as risk level 2, on a scale of 1 (most in need of technical assistance) 
to 4 (least in need of technical assistance). Miami had a troubled history as a CDBG grantee.
104 
Brevard County exceeded the minimum level for the set-aside (eventually obligating 33% of their 
grant to the set-aside), suggesting that they had not struggled with it.  
 
 
Figure 3: Expected Findings for Interviews 
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The above matrix shows the categories that I examined. This matrix is also based on Miles 
and Huberman.
105 The last column is an output that I expect the factors in all the other columns 
will influence. The lowest row, my interviews with the program administrators at HUD, differs 
from the interviews with the two grantees. Instead of focusing on the actions of HUD directly I 
asked them how they expected suburban grantees to behave, given the program they helped to 
design, and how urban and suburban grantees did behave. Though the questions I asked HUD 
were very similar to the questions I asked the grantees, they were phrased as “what did you 
expect” and “how did you assess” questions, not “what did you do” questions. I supplemented 
these interviews with semi-structured interviews with national nonprofits and TA providers to get 
a better sense of the role of non-profit partners. 
The cells of the matrix contain my expectations for the characteristics of the grantee or the 
grantee’s jurisdiction. For example, I expected that suburban grantees will have far less diversity 
in housing type (multi-family v. single-family) than urban grantees. The question marks indicate 
topics where I did not have grounded expectations. I was unsure, for example, of HUD’s plan to 
deal with grantees that had difficulty with the program. While I expected that urban grantees saw 
the set-aside as a means of increasing its affordable housing stock, I did not assume that this 
would be the motivation of suburban grantees. According to a technical assistance provider for 
HUD, some grantees were uninterested in creating affordable housing. The city leaders in 
Vallejo, CA, for example, attempted to satisfy their set-aside by rehabilitating a former Masonic 
temple, obligating $1.2 million to create four new units of affordable housing.
106 Their plan was 
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revised to increase the number of units created to 30 units, and reduced the amount of NSP 
funds used to $660,000.
107 
Because so little is known about NSP1, I decided to perform semi-structured interviews with 
open-ended questions. Though I had a hypothesis and a set of topics that I wanted the grantees 
to discuss, I wanted to give interviewees the space to describe aspects of the program outside of 
my interests. If my hypothesis was incorrect, or was less important than other factors, I wanted 
the interviewees to be able to tell me how to accurately describe their experience with NSP1. 
With this in mind I phrased questions asking interviewees to “please describe” the processes of 
interest.  
Though every interview took at least one unexpected and often fruitful turn, every interview 
was structured around the four characteristics that I focused on: capacity, nonprofit partners, 
foreclosed housing stock, goals. My interviews with grantees approached these topics using the 
interview instrument found in Appendix B. My interview with HUD officials used a similar 
structure: I described the four topics of my hypothesis and asked HUD officials to describe the 
extent to which these attributes affected grantees’ ability to administer the set-aside. I also asked 
HUD officials why they thought grantees struggled with the set-aside of NSP1, and what 
characteristics separated grantees that had difficulty from those that did not. My interviews with 
researchers, and nonprofits involved with NSP (including TA providers) began with the four 
categories and proceeded to the details of their findings about NSP, especially what they saw as 
the biggest challenges to grantees. 
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Chapter 4: Analysis of Interviews 
Findings from the interviews with the HUD NSP team are interwoven to put Miami and 
Brevard in context with the other 307 grantees. This analysis attempts to show how broad-scale 
challenges with NSP1, identified by HUD, manifested themselves in Miami and Brevard County 
while acknowledging the unique peculiarities of these grantees. Interviews are supplemented with 
reports from TA providers (which HUD supplied to the author upon request), and council 
minutes from the Brevard County legislature. 
The interviews and supplementary resources reveal some support for the hypothesis 
outlined in the previous chapter. Miami’s goals for NSP1’s set-aside did appear to be more 
related to the creation of affordable housing than Brevard County’s. Though Ann Kashmer was 
frustrated by inefficiencies in the city’s bureaucracy, Miami appeared to have far greater resources 
in terms of personnel and expertise than Brevard County, improving their ability to obligate their 
set-aside. Neither grantee, however, appeared to struggle due to a lack of NSP-eligible 
multifamily properties. Suburban grantees in general appear to have pursued scattered site rental 
strategies without exceptional difficulty.
108 There also appeared to be no obvious differences in 
the capacity of housing nonprofits between Brevard County and Miami. Unexpectedly, both 
grantees also partnered with for-profit developers to satisfy their set-aside. 
 
Goals 
The legislation that became NSP 1 had three goals: mitigate the effects of the foreclosure 
crisis, mitigate the ongoing “hemorrhaging” of affordable housing, and do both quickly.  The 
goals of foreclosure response were shaped by the Republican administration, which preferred to 
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deal with the negative effects of foreclosure instead of allocating resources to prevent 
foreclosures. In in the words of David Noguera, one of the senior administrators at HUD, “NSP 
is not foreclosure prevention, NSP is a cleanup tool for cities and counties.”
109 The concern for 
affordable housing was incorporated into the bill by the office of Barney Frank, a longtime 
advocate for affordable housing preservation.
110 As Noguera put it, “here was an opportunity! 
Housing values were down so communities could use this money to benefit low income families 
while addressing the foreclosure problem.” To ensure a speedy response, Congress used the 
CDBG program as a “chassis” for NSP, and included an 18-month deadline to obligate funds.
111  
HUD’s role in NSP1 was to help grantees understand and meet the goals established by 
Congress. As with CDBG, NSP1 was designed to allow local governments to create their own 
goals rather than give discretion to HUD.
112 As another senior member of the NSP team at 
HUD, Jessie Handforth Kome, put it, “we make [very] few value judgments, because a tenet of 
the CDBG program is that the local governments are going to know better what their choices 
should be.”
113 Thus HUD responded more strongly to low obligation rates than it did to poor 
grantee decisions that complied with HERA. Referring to one problem grantee the NSP team 
leader John Laswick stated, “they can [make poor decisions] in NSP1. [Because] they couldn’t 
find mortgages, they did 100% financing, which is a tremendous waste of money.”
114 Though 
HUD took a leading role when disbursing NSP2 funds and allocating technical assistance, their 
goals in NSP1 were for the most part limited to ensuring compliance with HERA. 
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For some grantees the goal of homeownership led to low obligation rates. The HUD 
team identified a mismatch between housing market and program design as the biggest factor 
that led to dozens of grantees with obligations of less than 10% to their set-aside with only 6 
months before the deadline. As Jessie Handforth Kome said, “the most common failing was that 
the program design didn’t match their market. Even grantees with low capacity who had matched 
their program design to their market ... were getting off to a pretty smooth start. [But] if you’re 
trying to do homeownership in Flint (which by the way they were), it won’t work.”
115 David 
Noguera pointed to a distaste for rental housing as a common problem that lead to mismatch, 
“there’s still a negative stigma that comes with rental housing. In many of the tipping point 
communities you have a lot of NIMBY’s that don’t want this …. [especially] in single-family 
detached neighborhoods.”
116 
Miami and Brevard County’s goals were closely related to their capacity. Because of their 
greater capacity, Miami formulated more goals that affected how money was obligated than 
Brevard County. When targeting areas where NSP funds would be used Miami had demographic 
targeting goals, while Brevard was most interested in selecting eligible properties as fast as 
possible. In Miami the terms of affordability for NSP were the same terms they used for other 
affordable housing programs run by the city. Brevard used the NSP-prescribed HOME minima 
(the lesser of the Fair Market Rent or 30% of 65% of AMI, almost guaranteeing that very-low-
income families would be paying more than 30% of their income on housing with periods of 
affordability as low as five years).
117 Both grantees recognized their limitations and limited their 
goals accordingly.  
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Pursuant to criteria specified in HERA, HUD specified census tracts where NSP funds 
could be used, and grantees the targeted properties within these tracts. This targeting was a 
means of enacting grantee goals. Miami requested that HUD expand the targeted area in order to 
allow NSP to reach multiple racial groups. Ann Kashmer, the administrator for NSP in Miami, 
described the motivation for the change in targeted area. “Half of the people [in Miami] live 
north of the river, and half of the people live south of the river. Our primary plan that was set up 
with HUD was … north of the river serving an African American population. [But] my Hispanic 
population lived south of the river. So I was not serving half of my population, and I couldn’t get 
my Hispanic population to move into my African American part of the neighborhood.”
118 Thus 
Miami requested that HUD expand their target area across the river, which HUD agreed to. 
Brevard County’s targeting was based mainly on the exigency of obligating money in 
time. Because of a long RFP process when selecting nonprofit partners, Brevard County’s 
overriding concern when selecting properties for NSP was speed. As Paula Davis, the NSP 
administrator for Brevard County, explained, “we didn’t even get our contracts [with our 
nonprofit partners] until February of 2010. Then we were like, ‘Oh my lord, how are we going to 
spend this money?! How are we going to do it?!’ And we just went for it. We didn’t have a lot 
time to think as strategically as I think we would have liked on, ‘here’s this neighborhood, here’s 
that neighborhood’ …. We contracted with developers and said, ‘here’s the areas. You guys go in 
go find the properties. We’ll do the due diligence.’”
119 
The difference in capacity was also apparent in the definitions of affordability that the 
grantees used. In Miami the city already had a policy for the definition for affordability. As 
Kashmer explained, “that was the city’s policy…. Under NSP [the definition of affordability] 
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could be the minimum or you could do more, and the city wanted more. Our policy is 30 years 
for homeownership and for rental.”
120 Brevard County used the minima described by outside 
sources. Their definitions “[were] based on HOME and … the Florida State Housing Initiative 
Partnership. That’s what’s driving our affordability levels.”
121 
Both Miami and Brevard County had a strong goal not to become property owners 
through NSP. In Miami the reasons were largely an acknowledgement of the city’s capacity. “We 
ended up owning about 10 [NSP properties], but that was never the original intent. … [We knew 
from] the past that we’re not good property owners. We don’t have the infrastructure set up 
internally to do that … The city is not a developer. Nobody in their right mind would ever think 
a city or municipality has this kind of capacity. By being an owner you’re just holding yourself up 
for liability.”
122 In Brevard County the decision was largely political, as purchasing property 
directly would involve the participation of the Board of County Commissioners. “We in Brevard 
County have decided as a County not to directly acquire properties… This has to do with the 
makeup of our board of County Commissioners … It was really semi-political that we did not 
want to be in the chain of ownership as Brevard County for those properties.”
123  
In order to make NSP more politically palatable, Brevard County Commissioners 
attached an amendment to the grantee’s action plan stating that one-third of NSP-funded 
housing went to veterans. Commissioners stated that NSP was a plan to bail out the banks, and 
that a veterans quota would be a means of “turn[ing] lemons into lemonade.”
124  Because few 
units have been marketed and occupied at this point, the effect of this policy is currently unclear.   
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Theoretically, block grant programs give local authorities the resources and freedom to 
address local goals. But because this was a new program implemented during very short time 
frame the ability of grantees to develop or pursue goals was limited. Though this shortcoming 
was most apparent with low capacity grantees like Brevard County, even relatively high-capacity 
grantees initially budgeted funds based on misunderstandings of the requirements of the program 
instead of their internal goals. Miami, for example, budgeted $100,000 towards a homeownership 
subsidy for one property because “[the grant administrators at the time] felt they needed to show 
[something] under homeownership. We were going to try to have someone in that category.”
125 
Grantees’ goals, then, were at times more a function of grantee capacity, rather than grantees’ 
political or economic visions. 
   
Capacity 
NSP strained the capacity of most grantees. HUD administrators had an impression of the 
limitations of grantees from years of administering CDBG, and knew of the difficulty that many 
grantees had with that program. As NSP team leader and department veteran John Laswick put 
it, “the really worst ones were bad before [NSP] came along.”
126 Yolanda Chavez, Deputy 
Assistant Secretary for all HUD Grant Programs, had previously worked for a CDBG grantee: 
the Los Angeles Housing Department. She stated that “it was a really big surprise to me as a 
former grantee, [to see] the lack of capacity in two-thirds of our grantees. There are [one-third 
that are] high capacity.”
127 In 18 months largely under-prepared grantees were expected to 
undertake a set of activities that many had never performed before. During the obligation period 
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grantees faced numerous internal problems, both bureaucratic and political, that hindered their 
ability to obligate grant funds. Grantees also grappled with a lack of staff and expertise and with 
the many stresses of local governments during the recession. Despite these difficulties, grantees 
built capacity internally and with assistance from HUD to obligate their grants, including the set-
aside. 
The 18-month obligation deadline for NSP1 was one of the biggest stressors for grantees. 
The deadline was established to respond to a sense of urgency that David Noguera compared to 
a dying person in an emergency room.
128 The speed required of a disaster response program, 
though, led to problems. In the words of John Laswick: “There’s a fine line between focusing 
people’s attention and making them obsessive …. To do something that they don’t know about, 
is more complicated than they are used to dealing with, have no experience with, fast – is a recipe 
for disaster. Honestly it’s miraculous that they got 99% obligated.”
129 For Miami and Brevard 
County this short timeline was further truncated by bureaucratic timelines. By the end of 2009, 
Miami had obligated less than 5% of its grant.
130 Kashmer explains the delay this way: “we were 
way behind in the end of December … but my projects were all in that queue that I couldn’t 
push any further because of commission meetings [and] because of legal obligation because of 
the outside committee meetings. … It took me till March 25
th of 2010 to … obligate my funds.
131 
Brevard County didn’t exceed a 5% obligation rate until three months before the September 
deadline.
132 The county’s delays happened for reasons similar to Miami’s. “Once the RFP [to 
contract with our developer partners] closed it went before a joint group of our CDBG board 
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and housing counsel. They released their recommendation, then we had an appeal, [but] it was 
late in the year, and other issues were coming before the board of county commissioners. So we 
didn’t even … contract until February of 2010.”
133  
Though all NSP grantees were CDBG entitlement communities, NSP required a radically 
different set of activities than CDBG. As John Laswick put it, “we have 1,200 CDBG grantees. 
300 acquire real estate in any given year. The other 75% don’t know much about property … 
[and] they definitely don’t know much about acquiring REO property or abandoned houses. 
That’s hard to do even if you know what you’re doing.”
134 This general characterization was true 
of Brevard County, which had “used CDBG primarily for infrastructure stuff,” and had no 
experience with REO acquisition and rehab.
135 Even the City of Miami, which much more staff 
and expertise, had very limited experience with the activities of NSP. To compensate for this 
weakness, Miami hired personnel with affordable housing development experience.
136 
Deputy Assistant Secretary Chavez hypothesized that part of the lack of capacity at the local 
level was “a real disinvestment in terms of capacity and support from the federal government.”
137 
Part of the limited capacity to run a program like NSP also may have come from political 
decisions in local government. Many cities did not want to become actively involved in affordable 
housing development or take an active role in development of any kind. This may have led to a 
lack of capacity brought on by historical local disinvestment in development experience. Political 
issues were also an immediate problem with some grantees. Brevard County Commissioners, 
whose cooperation was necessary for contract approval and the acquisition of large properties, 
showed limited support for NSP. In the first meeting on NSP one commissioner stated that he 
                                                 
133 Davis. 
134 Laswick. 
135 Davis. 
136 Kashmer. 
137 Chavez. Nathaniel Decker    13 March 2011 
45 
 
was “philosophically opposed to County government being forced to bail out banks … [and] 
tinkering with the free market.” He also opined that “local businesses and real estate industry is 
being hurt by government interference.”
138 A later meeting on NSP led to an argument among 
the commissioners. One commissioner stated that he would vote against all NSP-related motions 
until the Housing and Human Services Department conducted a workshop to explain NSP. 
Another commissioner chided him, asking if he was willing to “give up $5 million because he is 
uncomfortable.”
139 
In addition to internal political problems, bureaucratic inefficiencies also hampered 
implementation of NSP. Ann Kashmer, whose background was in the private sector, was 
particularly frustrated by the sclerosis of the city of Miami. “There’s no sense of urgency .... If I 
don’t follow a piece of a paper to get to my city manager it was taking a month to get a sign 
off…. [I had to] physically walk into their offices with a piece of paper and say ‘it’s an 
emergency.’ If I don’t say it’s an emergency it doesn’t get attention. My whole staff has done 
that.
140 Implementation of NSP in Brevard County was slowed by similar problems, “We had a 
lot of bureaucratic forces that impacted on how quickly we rolled out our program. … We [also] 
had a change of department leadership we had a major reorganization right in the middle of 
this.”
141  
The level of staffing and their expertise with housing programs was the most direct factor 
affecting the capacity of grantees to implement NSP. Speaking as both the head of grant 
programs at HUD and as a former grantee in Los Angeles, Yolanda Chavez said that “leadership 
is very important … because they have to understand what capacity they have and what capacity 
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they don’t, and be able to figure out how they get it.” She also emphasized the importance of 
expertise and organizational tools, saying that it was important to have “practitioners that 
understand housing and can assess their market conditions.”
142 Confronted with NSP, Miami 
chose to hire staff with experience in affordable housing development, in addition to utilizing 
their current staff. “They hired myself and I hired two other people. We used the environmental 
person, used a person [to ensure compliance with Davis Bacon labor requirements, and we used] 
the finance person for HUD. A lot of the infrastructure was in place already.”
143 Brevard County 
chose not to hire new staff, instead transferring a health care planner to lead NSP. As Paula 
Davis noted, “my job was going to go somewhere else so they said ‘here you can do [NSP]’. … I 
had no experience with CDBG HUD world
 [prior to NSP].”
144 The County also hired no new 
staff for the project, though Ms. Davis noted that “during some of that we really could have used 
it.”
145 
The Brevard County team thus spent much of NSP learning how the program worked 
instead of developing strategies to maximize the program’s impact. Ms. Davis explained how a 
lack of personnel and expertise prevented consideration of ways to make the program more 
effective. “We were all learning this type of program, just as HUD was learning how they wanted 
things to be done. It was really … us learning where we were: ‘we can’t forget this, let’s get this 
next. … Here’s this other part where we have to do: this 25% set-aside. … I’m doing this project; 
I’m doing this project; oh wait! I have to do that project too! So I’m behind on that project, I 
better figure out how to catch up!”
146  
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Miami’s capacity and expertise allowed them to improve their NSP implementation with 
Low Income Housing Tax Credits (LIHTC). LIHTC had the potential to be of more use to 
suburban grantees because of HUD regulations that prevent construction of multifamily in 
income impacted minority concentrated neighborhoods.
147 Miami, however, was able to leverage 
NSP funds used for demolition and redevelopment to finance new multifamily construction 
partly for the set-aside.
148  
Because NSP was a new program even high capacity grantees went through a learning 
process. Numerous HUD personnel talked about the “learning curve” for NSP.
149,150,151 Part of 
the learning experience was the process that Alan Mallach described as “seek[ing] out capacity 
wherever it can be found.”
152 Miami developed an innovative means of building capacity by 
creating an NSP Task Force. Ann Kashmer described the task force as follows:  
 
“It was set up by the City Commission when they reviewed the Action Plan. 
… They wanted the community to have input [during NSP] … to be able to tell 
staff what was happening in the community. We had realtors, we had brokers, we 
had commercial people that stay on the committee. That gave us good input of 
what was happening in the community. They were very active and our meetings 
were very active, they liked the committee so much that they extended it out and 
we still have it. [They’re still involved in NSP3] They actually approve our deals. 
We have a list of demolition properties: they approve those. … They approved our 
RFPs, they read them, they devoted many, many hours reviewing RFPs. They have 
input on some of the structure of some of our deals. And it’s open to the 
community, it’s advertised on our clerk’s calendar and on our NSP webpage so 
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anyone in the community can always come to the meetings … They’d propose 
certain things and we’d look into them, sometimes they come up with really good 
ideas … and we’d implement them. We had a woman that ran a nonprofit green 
enterprise in town … when we were putting together our green components she 
had made numerous suggestions of things that we needed to include in our rehab 
standards for our properties that were green, and those we adopted.”
153 
 
For Brevard County, much of the learning took the form of internal reorganization around 
the processes that NSP required. “We were able to get to a process [where we were] able to 
educate our partners over at the clerk’s office and over in purchasing about what we were trying 
to do: ‘What do you need from us to get this to happen?’ We worked as a group internally to look 
at: ‘here’s what I need as a contract administrator, here’s what the finance team needs, here’s the 
timeframe that we need to do and here’s our check off point. Here’s when we need to get it to 
our county finance in order to get a check cut by this time.’ A lot of it was trial and error with the 
first few of those to find where the hiccup was. We were really able to work out a good system 
once we did it a few times.”
154  
After the appropriation of $50 million in technical assistance funds as part of NSP2, HUD 
took a more active role in building grantee capacity starting in January 2010, nine months until 
the obligation deadline. HUD not only provided formal technical assistance with on-site 
consultants, they also conducted numerous webinars, problem solving clinics, and improved the 
usefulness of their website to grantees with the NSP Resource Center. Both Brevard County and 
Miami had generally positive opinions of these interactions with HUD. Ann Kashmer stated that 
“the webinars were great! They answered any questions you had, and it was a safe environment to 
ask any questions. … and if they didn’t get it they could ask again. … From an issues standpoint 
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that was great. The problem solving clinics … [allowed grantees] to meet other [grantees.] … It’s 
the most transparent I’ve ever seen HUD: putting up the Resource Center and Q and A’s. They 
have done much better roll-out with [NSP] in the past six months, with more transparency, [and 
more] assistance [than before NSP].”
155 Some HUD staff credited these kinds of assistance from 
HUD with the remarkable surge in obligation rates in the last few months of the program. A 
senior HUD administrator stated that “we expected a 75% obligation rate… What we didn’t 
expect was how well the problem solving clinic format was going to work. That led us both to 
run constant little seminars during the clinics to get basics into people, and then to sit down and 
answer really specific question to customize answers.”
156 Paula Davis also noted the improvement 
in HUD’s performance.
157 
 Miami and Brevard County saw limited value in the on-site needs assessments provided by 
consultants contracted by HUD. Kashmer was particularly irritated by the TA, noting that she 
had explained to HUD why her numbers were low, and why that was not a problem. She 
described the TA in terms of wasted staff time and taxpayer dollars and noted that she had more 
building experience than the TA providers. The TA report itself ranked Miami on the lowest two 
risk levels in all characteristics.
158 Paula Davis’ opinion of TA was similar, “the [TA] was 
beneficial in clarifying the set-aside and things like that, but the problems that we had were more 
internal … things that a TA from outside can’t really do for us.”
159 Though on-site technical 
assistance from consultants hired by HUD helped HUD understand the capacity of many 
grantees, it frustrated some grantees. 
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Foreclosed Housing Stock 
Whether confronted with multifamily or single-family units, the majority of grantees 
pursued rental strategies for their set-asides. John Laswick noted that homeownership programs 
are “hard to sustain … for the … set-aside. You need a support package of support systems that 
most communities don’t have.” He attributed the misguided decisions to pursue ownership 
programs for very-low income families to a lack of knowledge of the local housing market, not a 
limitation caused by the available NSP-eligible housing stock.
160 Scattered site rental was a very 
common means of satisfying the set-aside.
161 Communities like Miami, though, that had plenty of 
NSP-eligible multifamily housing available, and had the resources to purchase and rehab it, found 
advantages to doing so.  
Though Brevard had NSP-eligible multifamily properties, they chose not to use them in 
NSP, for both political and practical reasons. As Paula Davis explained, “anything over $100,000 
had to go to the board of county commissioners [which meets rarely] … [Because] even a duplex 
will cost more than [$100000] … we would not have made any deadlines.”
162 Additionally the 
eligible multifamily units were “too big – they would have eaten up all our dollars.”
163 Therefore 
Brevard County pursued a strategy of scattered site single-family rental for their set-aside.  
Miami chose to satisfy their set-aside using only multifamily rentals. This decision was 
largely made due to the large numbers of NSP eligible multifamily properties, including a number 
of half-built condominiums, and a LIHTC project that had lost its construction loan when 
Washington Mutual failed.
164 Miami also focused on multifamily in order to avoid owning any 
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units.
165 Miami also had the subsidies to support multifamily, largely made possible by having 
nonprofits that had received very large grants under NSP2.
166 This decision suggests that grantees 
could, given strong nonprofits and adequate subsidies, more effectively satisfy their set-asides 
with multifamily than single family. A lack of NSP-eligible multifamily properties, however did 
not appear to have been a large hindrance for Brevard County. 
 
Nonprofits and Other Partners 
  Because the vast majority of grantees had neither the capacity nor the desire to become 
developers, HUD recognized that partnerships were essential to NSP implementation.
167,168 In 
Miami and Brevard County partnerships with nonprofit and for-profit developers appear to have 
been quite successful implementing the NSP1 set-aside. Contracting, however adds another layer 
of responsibility to NSP, and grantees spent time and resources managing their partners to better 
satisfy the goals of the program. There are also questions about the legacy that these partnerships 
will leave when the program ends.  
Although Brevard County is suburban it was able to partner with a number of nonprofits. 
To implement its set-aside the County contracted with two nonprofits and one for-profit 
developer. “These are two of our best nonprofits. I believe they both are CHDOs [through the 
HOME program] as well. [They are] well known in our community [and] well known to our 
department.”
169 Though Paula Davis described these partnerships as being “very successful,” 
there have been some inefficiencies and costs. Two of the ten developers that the county 
contracted with through NSP were not used at all. “One … really wanted to focus on the [multi-
                                                 
165 Kashmer. 
166 Kashmer. 
167 Noguera. 
168 US Department of Housing and Urban Development. 
169 Davis. Nathaniel Decker    13 March 2011 
52 
 
family properties] which we couldn’t do because of our time frame.  The other didn’t want to do 
scattered site rentals.”
170 An appeal to the board of county commissioners by a developer who 
was not recommended slowed down the implementation of NSP by months, shortening further 
an already short timeline.
171 Contrary to the County’s goals, developers contracted by the city 
under NSP competed with private sector developers for foreclosed homes. “We had regular 
meetings with our developers. … [to tell them that] we want the ugly houses. We don’t want to 
be in a place that’s competing with the private investor. … Over time they became more 
educated of what we were looking for and [proposed] properties that were less likely to have any 
competition.”
172 Brevard’s experience demonstrates that even successful partnerships entailed 
risks and costs.  
Miami had a robust housing nonprofit community with experience in multifamily 
development.
173 NSP 2 boosted the capacity of Miami grantees, improving the implementation of 
the city’s NSP1 set-aside but also distancing nonprofits from the city. NSP2 was structured very 
differently than NSP1. HUD allocated $2 billion to far fewer grantees, who were mostly 
coalitions of nonprofits and local governments. Two very large awards went to a consortium of 
housing nonprofits in Miami and a Habitat for Humanity International branch in Miami, which 
collectively received well over $100 million.
174 NSP2 helped the city’s NSP1 projects. “[The] not 
for profits that received NSP2 funding … had sufficient funding … so they didn’t have to go to 
the banks for the long term debt that would have been associated with some of the projects. We 
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were able to marry NSP1 and NSP2. So that assisted some of our nonprofits to be able to have 
the capacity and the financial wherewithal to complete some of the transactions.”
175 However 
when asked if NSP1 had improved the relationship between the city and its partners, Kashmer 
was dubious, stating that local housing nonprofits were focused on their eight million NSP2 
grant, not on enriching their relationship with the city.
176 
 
Conclusion 
Of the four factors that I focused on, capacity issues and conflicted political goals appeared 
to be the most important explanations for why both urban and suburban grantees struggled with 
the set-aside requirement of NSP1. Because NSP1 was a new program with a very short time 
frame and required grantees to perform many novel activities, the majority of grantees struggled 
to some extent. HUD’s intervention with technical assistance helped grantees gain capacity to 
implement the program. HUD’s list of grantees’ risk levels identifies both suburban and urban 
grantees as high risk, suggesting that capacity problems were not more common in suburban 
grantees compared in urban grantees.
177 
A lack of foreclosed multifamily housing may not have posed significant issues for grantees’ 
obligation of their set-asides, though it may have affected the effectiveness of the set-asides. 
Scattered-site rental, developed by either a partner contracted by the grantee or (in some cases) 
the grantee itself, was a common strategy that didn’t pose a major problem to a suburban grantee 
such as Brevard County. Miami was able to extend their NSP funds further by pursuing 
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multifamily rental strategies for their set-asides, using LIHTC and leveraging private funds. This 
variation can be attributed to an urban/suburban difference. 
Grantees’ goals appeared to have a significant role in the effectiveness of NSP set-aside 
implementation. The Brevard County Commissioners’ opinion of NSP1 significantly affected the 
program by precluding multifamily development, including a quota for veterans, and making the 
program politically polarizing. Miami’s established affordable housing policies led them to ensure 
for longer terms of affordability than Brevard County, which did not have established affordable 
housing standards. The importance of having affordable housing policies in place before NSP1 
existed hints at the relationship between grantee capacity and grantee goals. Because Miami had 
built the capacity to administer affordable housing programs in the past they came to NSP1 with 
politically acceptable goals. These differences may have arisen from the political inclination of the 
local government, more than from urban/suburban differences. 
For both Miami and Brevard County nonprofit partners were essential for NSP 
implementation, though both counties also contracted with for-profit developers. David Noguera 
alluded to a lack of nonprofit partners for some grantees who had pursued misguided 
homeownership strategies and were forced to become landlords when unsold homes were 
converted to rental properties.
178 A study of the patterns of the dearth of both for-profit and 
nonprofit partners for NSP would reveal of these weaknesses fall into an urban/suburban 
typology. 
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Figure 4: Revised Conceptual Framework 
 
 
Figure 4 updates the initial conceptual framework in Figure 2 with the information gleaned 
from the interviews. The decisions that grantees made remain at the center of the process and are 
the proximate explanations for the three outcomes that describe grantee facility or difficulty with 
the NSP1 set-aside. In addition to the two outcomes that I initially looked for, I’ve added the 
extent to which grantees leveraged outside funds such as Miami’s use of NSP2 and LIHTC funds. Nathaniel Decker    13 March 2011 
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To clarify arrows that might be difficult to imagine I’ve included some labels that describe 
example actions. 
The revised framework recognizes that grantee capacity and grantee goals are more active 
nodes than I had previously conceived. They not only affect the decisions that grantees made, but 
were themselves affected by grantee decisions. Miami chose to hire staff, which increased its 
capacity. To acknowledge that grantee goals for the NSP1 set-aside were not formed solely by 
grantees I’ve added “Local Political Actors” to the framework.  
Differences between high-capacity and low-capacity grantees were magnified by the short 
time frame of NSP1. For Brevard County, and to some extent for HUD, compliance with the 18 
month deadline became the most pressing outcome of the program. One of the biggest 
revelations that came out of the interviews was the extent to which the grantee outcome of the 
speed with which they obligated NSP1 grants (including the set-aside) affected HUD’s behavior. 
This interaction is represented by the arrow labeled “DRGR,” the system that HUD used to keep 
track of grantees’ progress with NSP. The tardiness of grantee’s obligations was a significant part 
of why HUD lobbied for the $50 million NSP-TA allocation. 
Lastly, the revised framework better acknowledges the multiple scales of NSP. Specific 
problems that affected each unique grantee initially manifested themselves to HUD 
administrators as low national obligation rates on DRGR. HUD responded with NSP-TA, which 
provided flexible assistance in the form of webinars, problem solving clinics and a website that 
could directly address the peculiar problems of diverse grantees. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 
Policy Recommendations 
NSP is the first major new federal housing program since the introduction of the HOME 
and HOPE programs in 1990. The interviews analyzed above suggest that NSP, particularly the 
webinars, problem solving clinics, and increased responsiveness from HUD made possible by 
NSP-TA, is a promising development in the relationship between HUD and grantees. The 
potential of NSP to build the capacity of grantees may be a more important legacy of the 
program than its real, though limited, impact on neighborhoods. This section discusses the most 
promising aspects of NSP through a series of broad recommendations to Congress and HUD.  
 
Continue Building Grantee Capacity 
Aside from neighborhood stabilization itself and the preservation of affordable housing, one 
of NSP’s potential legacies is the building of grantees’ capacity. In addition to building capacity to 
implement other block grant programs (such as HOME and CDBG), grantees became more 
proficient at affordable housing development. As Deputy Assistant Secretary Chavez noted, most 
grantees managed these programs poorly because of a lack of a lack of leadership, expertise, and 
basic grant monitoring systems. She stated that it was “challenging to look at grantees that are not 
clear how much money they have in CDBG … they cannot even tell you what their balance is 
for.”
179 NSP not only more precisely revealed deficiencies in capacity, it also began to address 
them. 
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One promising feature of NSP3 is HUD’s renewed focus on building grantee capacity using 
TA funds from NSP2. Though grantees may have been frustrated by the needs assessments, they 
provided HUD and grantees with a detailed view of the limitations grantees faced. The HUD 
NSP team noted that one of the most common deficiencies was the lack of understanding of the 
local housing market, particularly when targeting NSP funds. HUD responded to this deficiency 
in NSP3 with a tool that grantees could use to pinpoint the most distressed areas in their 
jurisdiction.
180 Though this tool may be of limited use to a relatively high-capacity grantee like 
Miami, Brevard County relied heavily on this tool when selecting their targeted area for NSP3.
181 
In addition to the surge in obligation rate that TA may have led to, HUD administrators noted 
that grantees were becoming more strategic and thoughtful about implementation of NSP. As 
John Laswick put it, “we weren’t talking about strategy two years ago.”
182 
HUD has continued to expand its efforts to build grantee capacity. It has consolidated TA 
provision among CDBG, HOME, and the special needs programs. Chavez described further 
assistance meant to develop grantees’ capacity for affordable housing development. She said that, 
beginning shortly, HUD will “roll out underwriting training … week long underwriting courses 
that we’ll offer to our grantees. We’re going to do ten around the country, because we know how 
difficult it is for them to travel. We’re going to do ten for single family underwriting, and ten for 
multifamily underwriting. This is about NSP, but it’s also quite beyond that, because these skills 
really allow us to build capacity.”
183 
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Preserve Grantee Capacity 
Grantees have been benefitting from HUD’s increasing focus on building grantee capacity. 
Policies at the federal and local level should be implemented that preserve this capacity. David 
Noguera identified two major threats to the preservation of grantee capacity. “We’re finding 6 
months later because of budget cuts, the city had to lay off [the grantee employees trained by 
HUD], or for whatever reason they took their skills and they sold them and took a job with one 
of our TA providers. So you end up losing a lot of the good staff and you end up with people 
who are straight out of school.”
184 The current fiscal crises of many state and local governments 
make these both of these concerns especially pressing. Layoffs are the most obvious threat, but 
cuts in salary and benefits makes talented and capable public employees more likely to move to 
the private sector, or not enter the public sector in the first place. 
HUD is attempting to invest directly in the grantees. Losing expertise to TA providers 
makes block grant programs less efficient. Beyond efficiency, building grantee capacity will 
almost certainly have positive effects beyond improved administration of the program under 
which the training occurred. Most obviously, TA provided under NSP will almost certainly 
improve grantees’ implementation of CGBG, HOME, and the special needs programs. It is also 
likely that investment in capacity through these block grant programs will improve grantee 
performance beyond the federal programs that they administer by making state and local 
affordable housing programs more effective. For this reason, federal and local policies should be 
altered to retain experienced employees whose skills have been developed through HUD 
programs. 
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Continue Improving the Relationship Between HUD and Grantees 
NSP appears to have improved grantees’ opinion of HUD. Yolanda Chavez noted that 
“what we hear from our grantees on NSP is extremely positive in terms of the way that the 
relationship has changed between HUD and the NSP grantees. What [we] hear from grantees is 
that HUD should be like NSP.”
185 Both Brevard County and Miami mentioned that NSP was 
well managed by HUD. Ann Kashmer of Miami said that “[NSP] is the most transparent I’ve 
ever seen HUD. In the past six months they’ve done a much better roll out and have been more 
transparent and very much assisting you in trying to get things done.”
186 This improvement is 
largely due to projects initiated with the $50 million in TA money from NSP2. 
Though grantees may have been frustrated by the needs assessments that HUD conducted, 
the weaknesses that HUD discovered have improved the ways in which HUD provides assistance 
to grantees. There are signs that NSP has made grantees more eager for HUD assistance.
187,188 
Though the novelty of the program and short timeframe for implementation may have hurt the 
effectiveness of the program, it focused HUD’s attention on chronically underperforming 
grantees. There are signs that grantees appreciated this assistance from HUD whose programs 
they had implemented for decades. 
 
Maybe More NSP 
One of the most common observations in the literature was the inadequacy of NSP in the 
face of the foreclosure crisis. As Ann Kashmer, the NSP administrator in Miami, noted, “I could 
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have used ten times the amount of money. It was drop in the bucket. [Though] it was a good 
bucket.”
189 In congressional testimony delivered in defense of NSP3, HUD Assistant Secretary of 
Community Planning and Development Mercedes Marquez acknowledged the relative puniness 
of NSP, “there were 1.7 million foreclosure completions between April 2009 and December 2010 
and we expect NSP will impact 100,000 properties in the nation’s hardest-hit markets.”
190 NSP 
was not designed to the scale necessary to address the national foreclosure crisis. 
Because HUD and grantees targeted funds within their jurisdictions, however, NSP probably 
did help stabilize some neighborhoods. Marquez noted that because NSP had rehabbed or 
demolished and redeveloped nearly 20% of REOs in targeted areas, NSP created a “multiplier 
effect,” as public investment through NSP made neighborhoods more attractive to private 
investment. Though Ann Kashmer was critical of the political motive of the program, she 
believed that “it ultimately will bring some good into each of our communities.”
191 Though it is 
too soon for an accurate assessment of NSP’s stabilizing effect on communities, these are 
promising signs. A full assessment of this effect will determine whether this approach should be 
taken in future foreclosure crises. 
 
Emphasize the Goal of Affordable Housing Preservation 
One of NSP’s political liabilities was its association with the bank bailouts. Brevard County 
Commissioners consistently disparaged NSP as a bank bailout.
192 Miami NSP administrator Ann 
Kashmer shared this opinion. “I don’t know if [neighborhood stabilization] was really the 
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purpose of NSP1. NSP1 was the bailout of the banks … that was the primary purpose of it. … 
This was not … ‘we’re going back in and stabilizing the neighborhoods kind of thing,’ [though] 
that was the way they sugar-coated it. It was to get the real estate assets off the banks’ books.”
193  
Though assistance to banks may have been an important motivation for passing NSP1, its 
impact on banks would be about as significant as NSP1’s impact on the nation’s housing stock. 
NSP1 provided $4 billion to be used by grantees not only for purchase of abandoned and 
foreclosed properties, but also for redevelopment, rehab, demolition, and establishment of 
financing mechanisms for homeowners. Three months after the passage of NSP1 in HERA 
Congress provided $700 billion directly to banks through TARP, reducing NSP1’s relative impact 
on banks to insignificance.
194 
Potentially more important than NSP1’s effect on banks and on neighborhood stabilization 
was the goal that Barney Frank added to the program: the preservation and creation of affordable 
housing. The low prices of housing in some areas, coupled with the income requirements of the 
program had the potential to temporarily stanch the hemorrhage of affordable housing in 
grantees’ jurisdictions. Though the sugar coating of emergency foreclosure-response was 
probably the most politically feasible way of shepherding NSP in its early stages, a change in 
rhetoric to the language of affordable housing preservation may help defend the program now 
that the crisis has passed and that the program’s association to bailout is a liability. 
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Monitoring and Evaluation 
These issues all relate to a larger question: was CDBG the right platform for the goals of NSP? 
By using CDBG, HUD had the opportunity to build local capacity and potentially improve 
outcomes by allowing local governments to craft local response to local patterns of foreclosure. This 
approach, however, magnified the huge variations in grantees’ abilities to implement the program. 
Devolving implementation also meant that contentious local politics at times reduced the potential 
effectiveness of the program. Competitive grants like NSP2 almost certainly will be more efficient 
than formula grant programs like NSP1, but at the expense of not addressing severe foreclosure 
problems in areas that are not served by high capacity nonprofits or local governments such as 
Brevard County. 
To address the inefficiencies of formula grant programs without giving up on low-capacity 
jurisdictions, HUD should implement more rigorous monitoring and evaluation programs. HUD 
officials noted that most underperforming NSP1 grantees were also chronically underperforming 
CDBG grantees. Requiring that grantees reflect on their administration of grants, including 
identifying weaknesses would help low-capacity grantees build and preserve capacity. HUD could 
establish a system that sets baselines for performance, and provides resources and consequences for 
low-capacity grantees. Performance standards should be at least considered for all formula grant 
programs, particularly NSP1, NSP3, and CDBG. 
 
The Political Future of NSP 
The time in which HERA was developed was auspicious for NSP1 both politically and 
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intervention. Housing prices were plummeting, which presented an opportunity to acquire 
affordable housing and ensure that it would stay affordable even when markets rebounded. The 
current political and economic context works against NSP. Local governments across the country 
are facing budgetary crises, leading to the potential loss of the capacity that NSP has built. Because 
of the program’s association with the bailout and the negative view of government spending and 
interventions, NSP is politically vulnerable. In a recent congressional hearing on bills that would 
defund NPS3, Congressman Gary Miller of Orange County California painted NSP as a government 
handout program to shady nonprofits.
195 
Larger, more detailed studies of NSP will undoubtedly be conducted as the program’s effects 
on neighborhoods across the country become apparent. Because of the political vulnerability of the 
program and its ilk, the entities that conduct these studies should first consider all of the effects of 
NSP. To measure the effects of NSP by examining only the extent to which it stabilized 
neighborhoods would be short-sighted and misleading. In addition to stabilizing neighborhoods 
NSP created affordable housing, built grantee capacity, and improved the relationship between 
grantees and HUD. Serious further studies of the program need to look particularly carefully at 
capacity. This paper began with the thesis that suburban grantees were at a disadvantage compared 
to urban grantees when implementing NSP1’s set-aside. This paper provides evidence that the 
difference between high-capacity and low-capacity grantees is more important than the 
urban/suburban difference. It would be a disservice to everyone who implemented and was affected 
by NSP to assess the program on a narrow range of criteria.
                                                 
195 House Financial Services Committee’s Subcommittee on Insurance, Housing, and Community Opportunity. 
Legislative Proposals to End Taxpayer Funding for Ineffective Foreclosure Mitigation Programs., 2011. Web. Nathaniel Decker    13 March 2011 
65 
 
Appendix A 
Schedule of Interviews 
 
Name  Title  Organization  Date  Topic 
Ed Gramlich 
Regulatory 
Director/State 
Partner Liaison 
National Low Income 
Housing Coalition 
10/18/10 
DRGR and QPR 
reliability, patterns of 
grantee set-aside 
fulfillment 
Kent Buhl 
Technical 
Assistance 
Provider 
KB Consulting  11/12/10 
Kent’s observations as 
a provider of technical 
assistance for NSP1 
grantees. 
Mai Nguyen 
Assistant 
Professor 
University of North 
Carolina Chapel Hill 
11/12/10 
Mai’s research project 
on foreclosures in 
Miami. 
Sarah 
Greenberg 
Stable 
Communities 
Program Manager 
Neighborworks  12/9/10  Nonprofits and NSP1. 
Ann R. Kashmer 
NSP Project 
Manager 
City of Miami 
 
1/13/11 
 
Interview using the 
schedule in Appendix 
B. 
David Noguera  CPD Specialist 
Office of Block Grant 
Assistance, HUD 
1/14/11 
Interview using the 
schedule in Appendix 
B. 
Jessie 
Handforth Kome 
Deputy Director 
Office of Block Grant 
Assistance, HUD 
1/14/11 
Interview using the 
schedule in Appendix 
B. 
John Laswick  NSP Team Leader 
Office of Block Grant 
Assistance, HUD 
1/14/11 
Interview using the 
schedule in Appendix 
B. 
Yolanda Chavez 
Deputy Assistant 
Secretary for 
Grant Programs 
Office of Community 
Planning and 
Development, HUD 
1/14/11 
The role of technical 
assistance in NSP. 
Ryan Flanery  DRGR Specialist 
Office of Block Grant 
Assistance, HUD 
1/14/11  GIS and DRGR data. 
Paula Davis  Staff Specialist IV 
Department of Housing 
and Human Services 
Brevard County, FL 
3/14/11 
Interview using the 
schedule in Appendix 
B. Nathaniel Decker    13 March 2011 
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Appendix B 
 
Instrument for Grantee Interviews 
 
The topics that I want the grantees to talk about: 
1.  What goals the grantee had for the set-aside initially, and if these goals changed over time. 
2.  The extent to which a lack of diversity of housing type and tenure limited their ability to 
effectively satisfy the set-aside. 
3.  The extent to which grantees were experienced working with the 50% AMI population, and the 
capacity of the grantee to satisfy their goals. 
4.  The extent to which the grantee was able to partner with non-profits (to judge non-profit 
capacity).  
5.  The $/families helped ratio for the set-aside. 
6.  What they’ve learned and how their approach to the set-aside has changed from NSP1 to NSP3. 
 
 
 
The questions that I intend to ask to get them to talk about these topics: 
1.  GOALS: One of the things I’ve been asking grantees is how your goals for NSP1 changed over time. 
What did you initially set out to do when you were writing up your Action Plan, and how did those 
goals evolve into how you eventually obligated money to your set-aside? (Try to get at housing 
market too!) 
a.  [I describe the 11 units acquired and rehabbed to be turned into rental housing.] Please 
describe the strategies your office eventually used to obligate the set-aside. 
b.  What role did housing market analysis play in the decisions that your office made regarding 
the set-aside? 
c.  What definition of affordability did your office use? Why? Why not longer? 
2.  FORECLOSED HOUSING STOCK:  
a.  Explain how your office decided to use homeownership and rental strategies to fulfill the 
set-aside. 
i.  What was the mix of foreclosed rental and for-sale properties that you dealt with? 
Did a lack of rental units or property management companies hinder your ability to 
fulfill the set-aside? 
ii.  What was the mix of foreclosed single-family versus multifamily housing that you 
dealt with? Did a lack of multifamily hinder your ability to fulfill the set-aside? 
b.  [I expect that they initially tried to do all for-sale for LH25 and supplement with 
downpayment assistance.] 
3.  NONPROFITS: Please describe how your office partnered or worked with non-profit housing 
services companies before NSP.  
a.  How many non-profit housing services companies did your office attempt to work with to 
obligate set-aside money? How large are they? Nathaniel Decker    13 March 2011 
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b.  How important were non-profit housing services companies to your office when you were 
obligating set-aside money? 
c.  In what ways did working with non-profit housing services company A make fulfilling the 
set-aside easier? Were there any instances when partnering with these companies frustrated 
your attempts to fulfill the set-aside? 
d.  In what ways did working with non-profit housing services company B make fulfilling the 
set-aside easier? Were there any instances when partnering with these companies frustrated 
your attempts to fulfill the set-aside? 
4.  CAPACITY (personnel, expertise):  
a.  Do you think that if your office had more time or expertise with housing the target 
population, you would have been able to help many more families? If so, how? 
b.  Did your office hire new staff to manage NSP? 
c.  Many grantees had almost no experience acquiring properties before NSP. I’m curious if 
your office did, and if this was a significant difficulty to obligate funds. Compete with 
speculators where you are? 
d.  Leveraging funds, LIHTC 
e.  Housing market 
5.  One of HUD’s goals for NSP1, particularly the technical assistance provided, is that it builds capacity 
for grantees. Do you think that NSP1, and the NSP in general has increased the capacity of your 
office? 
a.  Looking back, are you satisfied with the result of the program? 
b.  In what ways has your experience with the NSP1 set-aside affecting your plans for the NSP3 
set-aside? 
c.  Interaction with HUD, problem solving clinics, webinars, TA? 
d.  In what ways would you have changed NSP1 to better address Broward County’s 
foreclosure problem? (Criticism.) 
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